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Domestic Violence and International Child Abduction at the Border
of Canadian Family and Refugee Law
MICHELLE HAYMAN
Cet article porte sur l’interaction problématique entre la Convention sur les aspects civils
de l’enlèvement international d’enfants et le droit des réfugiés au Canada, surtout lorsque
des allégations de violence conjugale pèsent sur le parent qui se retrouve seul. Il aborde la
façon dont les cours de la famille canadiennes, principalement en Ontario, ont traité les
demandes de statut de réfugié en cours en parallèle lors de leur prise de décisions
relativement à l’application de la Convention de La Haye. Il examine également le
traitement du droit relatif à l’enlèvement international d’enfants dans les décisions
canadiennes en matière de détermination du statut de réfugié qui comportent des
allégations de violence conjugale. L’auteure termine en suggérant des changements
juridiques et des changements en matière de politique à apporter pour aider à réduire le
fardeau injuste qu’impose l’interaction entre ces régimes juridiques aux membres de la
famille qui fuient la violence conjugale.
This article explores the problematic interaction of the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction with refugee law in Canada, particularly where
domestic violence by the left-behind parent is alleged. It discusses how Canadian family
courts, primarily in Ontario, have treated concurrent refugee claims when deciding Hague
Convention applications. As well, it explores the operation of international child abduction
law in Canadian refugee determinations where domestic violence is alleged. The article
concludes by offering suggestions about legal and policy changes which could help reduce
the unfair burden the interaction of these legal regimes places on family members fleeing
domestic violence.

THIS ARTICLE EXPLORES THE PROBLEMATIC INTERACTION of the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction1 (Hague Convention) with refugee law in Canada
and provides suggestions for legal changes to reduce the unfair burden this interaction places on
family members fleeing domestic violence. As will be discussed, two major problems arise in the
interaction between Hague Convention proceedings and refugee claims in Canada. First,
challenges arise in the interpretation and application of the Hague Convention where a taking
parent2 or their child has initiated a claim for protection as a refugee. Second, a woman who has
fled across national boundaries with her child may face allegations of international child abduction
*Michelle Hayman is a judicial law clerk at the Federal Court and former articling student at the Office of the
Children’s Lawyer. This paper was written prior to her current role. The views expressed in this article are those of
the author and do not reflect those of the Federal Court or of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer. She would like to
thank Audrey Macklin for her feedback on an earlier version of this article, and Janet Mosher, Nicholas Hay, and two
anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful comments.
1
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 25 October 1980, 1343 UNTS 89 [Hague
Convention].
2
This article will use the term “taking parent” to describe a parent who leaves a country of “habitual residence” with
their children and “left-behind parent” to describe the other parent.
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and thus be excluded from claiming refugee status for having committed “a serious non-political
crime” under Article 1F(b) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee
Convention).3
The Hague Convention is a multilateral treaty which aims to protect children “from the
harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their
prompt return to the State of their habitual residence.”4 It has been incorporated into domestic
family law legislation in all Canadian jurisdictions.5 A left-behind parent may file an application
in a Canadian jurisdiction for the return of the child removed to Canada in order to resolve custody
and access matters in the place of the child’s habitual residence.6 The drafters of the Convention
primarily intended to stop parents without custody rights from circumventing the family law
process by fleeing the country. 7 According to the most recent statistics available from 2008,
approximately sixty-nine per cent of the taking parents in Hague Convention applications were
mothers, and seventy-three per cent were primary or joint primary caregivers.8
A large body of academic writing critiques the operation of the Convention in cases of
domestic violence, as it may force the return of a child, as well as a taking parent who is unwilling
to let their child return alone to a dangerous situation. 9 Less attention has been given to the
dramatic impact that allegations of child abduction may also have on refugee claims made by a
parent and child, especially where their asylum claim is based on the abuse perpetrated by the leftbehind parent.
Individuals fleeing domestic violence across borders may seek refugee status in the country
of arrival. In order to be recognized as a Convention refugee, an applicant must demonstrate a
“well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion.” 10 In the Canadian refugee determination system,
domestic violence has been recognized, in some circumstances, as amounting to persecution.11
However, as will be discussed further below, a successful Hague Convention application
can force the return of a child before the resolution of their refugee claim. 12 Evidence of a
Convention application may also exclude the taking parent from making a refugee claim, as child

3

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150, art 1F(b) [Refugee Convention].
Hague Convention, supra note 1, Preamble.
5
Nicholas Bala & Mary Jo Maur, “The Hague Convention on Child Abduction: A Canadian Primer” (2014) 33:3
CFLQ 267 at 269 [Bala & Maur]; Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c C 12, s 46 [CLRA]
6
Hague Convention, supra note 1,art 12; CLRA, supra note 5 at s 46(5).
7
Bala & Maur, supra note 5 at 270.
8
Rona Schuz, The Hague Child Abduction Convention: A Critical Analysis (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) at 56
[Schuz].
9
See e.g. Shani M King, “The Hague Convention and Domestic Violence: Proposals for Balancing the Policies of
Discouraging Child Abduction and Protecting Children from Domestic Violence” (2013) 47 Fam L W 299; Taryn
Lindhorst & Jeffrey L Edleson, Battered Women, Their Children and International Law (Boston: Northeastern
University Press, 2012) [Lindhorst & Edleson]; Carol Bruch, “The Unmet Needs of Domestic Violence Victims and
Their Children in Hague Child Abduction Convention Cases” (2004) 38 Fam L Q 529.
10
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s 96 [IRPA].
11
Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2 SCR 689 [Ward]; See also Chairperson Guidelines 4: Women
Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution (Ottawa: Immigration and Refugee Board, 1996), online:
<irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/BoaCom/references/pol/GuiDir/Pages/GuideDir04.aspx > [perma.cc/MW3C-RTWF] [Gender
Guidelines].
12
See e.g. GB v VM, 2012 ONCJ 745 [GB v VM].
4
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abduction is framed as a serious non-political crime.13 In an increasingly globalized and mobile
world, international parental child abduction is “an area in which immigration law and family law
principles will continue to clash.”14
Part I of this article provides a brief overview of the Hague Convention on Child
Abduction and some of the critiques of its operation in situations of domestic violence. Part II
discusses the Hague Convention’s operation in the Canadian context at the intersection of family
and refugee law. It explores how Canadian family courts, primarily in Ontario, have treated
concurrent refugee claims when deciding Hague Convention applications. Part III discusses the
operation of international child abduction law in Canadian refugee determinations where domestic
violence is alleged. The paper concludes in Part IV by suggesting how to address some of the
failures of Canadian refugee and family law where a parent and their child make an asylum claim
based on domestic violence.

I. THE HAGUE CONVENTION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
A. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONVENTION
It is necessary to understand the framework of the Hague Convention on Child Abduction in order
to appreciate its implications for domestic violence and its operation in Canadian family and
refugee law. The Convention is one of many international treaties under the Hague Conference on
Private International Law. 15 First adopted by the conference in 1980, there were eighty-eight
signatory member states as of 2013.16 All Canadian provinces and territories have legislatively
adopted the Convention as part of their provincial family law.17
Article 1 of the Convention describes the objects of the treaty as: “a) to secure the prompt
return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and b) to ensure
that rights of custody and access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected
in the other Contracting States.” 18 The Convention provides for the creation of “Central
Authorities”: government agencies designed to assist with its enforcement.19
A removal will be wrongful where the left-behind parent has “rights of custody” over the
20
child, was exercising those rights at the time the child was removed,21 the child is under sixteen,22
and was “habitually resident” in the left-behind country.23 As Bala and Maur describe, “the central
premise is that in most cases only the court in a child’s habitual place of residence has the
13

IRPA, supra note 10, s 98; Refugee Convention, supra note 3, art 1F(b); See e.g. Kovacs v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1473 [Kovacs].
14
Michael Battista & Kelly D Jordan, Canadian Family and Immigration Law: Intersections, Developments and
Conflicts (Toronto: Carswell, 2015) at 263.
15
Bala & Maur, supra note 5 at 269.
16
Schuz, supra note 8 at xi.
17
Bala & Maur, supra note 5 at 269.
18
Hague Convention, supra note 1, art 1.
19
Bala & Maur, supra note 5 at 270.
20
Hague Convention, supra note 1, art 3(a).
21
Ibid, art 3(b).
22
Ibid, art 4.
23
Ibid, art 3(a).

Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2018

116

Journal of Law and Social Policy, Vol. 29 [2018], Art. 6

jurisdiction to make determinations about the child’s best interests.”24 A successful application
will lead to the return of the child to their place of habitual residence.

B. THE ARTICLE 13(B) EXCEPTION
There are, however, some limited exceptions to returning the child within the Convention. In the
context of refugee law and domestic violence, the most significant exception is Article 13(b),
which states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative
authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the
person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that …
b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.25
The drafters of the Convention intended this exception to be “interpreted in a restrictive fashion”
and be limited in use.26
The Supreme Court of Canada has followed this intention and interpreted Article 13(b)
narrowly. Justice La Forest in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Thomson v Thomson,
observed that Nourse LJ had expressed the test correctly in holding that, “not only must the risk
be a weighty one … it must [also] be one of substantial, and not trivial, psychological harm.”27
The onus is on the taking parent to establish that returning the child would expose the child to
grave risk. In Canada, this exception is the subject of the most litigation in Hague Convention
applications.28

C. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS GRAVE RISK
The grave risk exception is the locus of cases where domestic abuse is alleged, as the taking parent
must establish that returning the child would expose the child to physical or psychological harm,
or otherwise place them in an “intolerable situation.” In Canada, the jurisprudence has recognized
that domestic violence against a parent may be considered to create a “grave risk” of harm to the
child, even where the violence is not directed at the child.29 As the Ontario Court of Appeal held
in Husid v Daviau, “from a child-centred perspective, harm is harm … Article 13(b) is available
to resist a child’s return when the reason for the child’s removal is violence directed primarily at
the parent who removed the child.”30 This approach accords with social science research, which

24

Bala & Maur, supra note 5 at 273.
Hague Convention, supra note 1, art 13(b).
26
Catherine Norris, “Immigration and Abduction: The Relevance of US Immigration Status to Defences Under the
Hague Convention on International Child Abduction” (2010) 98:1 Cal L Rev 159.
27
Thomson v Thomson, [1994] 3 SCR 551 at 597.
28
Bala & Maur, supra note 5 at 290.
29
Pollastro v Pollastro, [1999] OJ No 911 [ON CA].
30
Husid v Daviau, 2012 ONCA 655 at para 22.
25
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demonstrates that witnessing domestic violence has a negative effect on the mental health and
well-being of children.31
However, courts have insisted on maintaining a high threshold for meeting the Article
13(b) exception, in order to preserve the objectives of the Hague Convention. For instance, in Ellis
v Wentzell-Ellis, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the application judge set the bar for an
“intolerable situation” too low because there was only one incident of physical violence towards
the mother.32 Rather than lowering the threshold, Canadian courts have sometimes responded by
adding “undertakings” to return orders, such as limited communication orders, which may not be
enforceable once the parent and child have returned to the other country.33
Taking parents are likely to have a particularly difficult time establishing the grave risk
exception where an abusive relationship is not necessarily characterized by violence. As Evan
Stark has demonstrated, physical violence is not necessarily present in all situations of domestic
abuse. 34 Abusive relationships may be more accurately categorized through the element of
“coercive control,” which Stark describes as “an ongoing strategy of intimidation, isolation, and
control that extends to all areas of a woman’s life including sexuality; material necessities;
relations with family, children, and friends; and work.”35 While Canadian courts have recognized
the negative effects on children of witnessing physical violence, there is little recognition of how
coercive control could rise to the level of a grave risk of psychological harm in particular. In these
situations, the Hague Convention may become another tool of control for an abuser, as it can force
the return of their child and former partner.
It is difficult to know how many international parental child-abduction cases involve
parents fleeing abuse globally. According to the Central Authority of the Hague, one study
concluded that “some form of family violence was found to be present in as many of fifty-four per
cent of the relationships in which parental child abduction occurred” and “30% of the left behind
parents admitted to engaging in or having been accused of acts of family violence.” 36 And yet,
globally, the grave risk defence is only successful in approximately twenty-five per cent of cases
where the taking parent alleged there was domestic violence.37 As Lindhorst and Edleson argue,
“[u]nder the current policies and procedures emanating from the Hague Convention, the treaty
indicates that women should stay with their children in the country where they are living, even in
See e.g. Howard Meltzer et al, “The Mental Health of Children who Witness Domestic Violence” (2009) 14:4
Child & Family Social Work 491; Stephanie Holt et al, “The Impact of Exposure to Domestic Violence on Children
and Young People: A Review of the Literature” (2008) 32:8 Child Abuse & Neglect 797.
32
Ellis v Wentzell-Ellis, 2010 ONCA 347 at para 44 [Ellis]; For further discussion, see Linda C Neilson, Enhancing
Safety: When Domestic Violence Cases are in Multiple Legal Systems (Criminal, family, child protection): A Family
Law, Domestic Violence Perspective (Department of Justice, 2013) at 90-96, online: <justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fllf/famil/enhan-renfo/neilson_web.pdf> [perma.cc/4W9S-BTWU].
33
See e.g. JP v TNP, 2016 ABQB 613 at para 57; Finizio v Scoppio-Finizio, 46 OR (3d) 226 at para 44 (CA).
34
Evan Stark, Coercive Control: How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007) [Stark, Coercive Control].
35
Evan Stark, “Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control” (1995)
58:4 Alb L Rev 973 at 986.
36
Permanent Bureau, “Domestic and Family Violence and the Article 13 ‘Grave Risk’ Exception in the Operation of
the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: A Reflection
Paper,” Hague Conference on Private International Law (May 2011) online:
<assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/abduct2011pd09e.pdf> [perma.cc/23H8-UQ9X] [Permanent Bureau, “Reflection
Paper”].
37
Schuz, supra note 8 at 282.
31
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the face of serious abuse.”38 There is significant concern that the provisions intended to protect
children may exacerbate their vulnerabilities by sending them back to violent homes.39
The relationship between Article 13(b) and domestic violence is made even more complex
by the interaction of refugee claims and the Hague Convention. Where a mother and child have
made a successful refugee claim, she will more easily meet the threshold for the Article 13(b)
exception. However, as will be seen, where a refugee claim is in progress, no similar safeguards
exist. The next section of the article explores the impact of refugee claims, particularly based on
domestic violence, in the determination of Hague Convention applications in Ontario.

II. THE IMPACT OF REFUGEE DETERMINATIONS IN
HAGUE CONVENTION APPLICATIONS IN ONTARIO
A. AMRI v KER: ARTICLE 13(b) WHERE A REFUGEE CLAIM HAS
BEEN SUCCESSFUL
In 2011, the issue of how refugee status operates in Hague Convention applications in Ontario
received broad public attention when a Hague Convention case reached the Ontario Court of
Appeal. 40 AMRI v KER involved a young girl from Mexico who had successfully made a refugee
claim based on the risk of harm she faced from her abusive mother. 41 She came to Canada
independently of her father and remained there after he left for Norway when his own refugee
claim failed. After the girl had been living in Toronto for approximately eighteen months with her
aunts, her mother made a Hague Convention application for her return to Mexico. Without hearing
from the child, her father, or her aunts, the application judge found she was wrongfully detained
in Ontario and granted an order for her immediate return to her mother in Mexico.42 Following the
order, immigration officers pulled her out of school and deported her to Mexico.43 A few months
later however, the girl was able, with the assistance of her aunt, to return to Canada.44
Meanwhile her father appealed the decision, providing the Court of Appeal with an
opportunity to discuss the relationship between the Hague Convention, codified in section 46 of
the Ontario Children’s Law Reform Act (CLRA),45 and the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act (IRPA). The father argued that section 46 of the CLRA conflicted with section 115 of the IRPA
and was thus invalid due to the principle of federal paramountcy. Section 115 codifies the principle
of “non-refoulement,” which protects persons from being returned to a country where they face a
risk of persecution. 46 The Court held that there was no conflict for two reasons. First, the term
38

Lindhorst & Edleson, supra note 9 at 2.
See Permanent Bureau, “Reflection Paper,” supra note 36 at 4.
40
See e.g. Nicholas Keung, “Court Orders Ottawa to Return Mexican Refugee” Toronto Star (18 April 2011)
online: <thestar.com/news/investigations/2011/04/18/court_orders_ottawa_to_return_mexican_refugee.html>
[perma.cc/X72C-CAUS].
41
AMRI v KER, 2011 ONCA 417 [AMRI].
42
Ibid at paras 3-7.
43
This incident raises the issue of what role Canada Border Services (CBSA) was playing in the enforcement of the
Hague Convention, illustrating the entangled nature between immigration law and enforcement of the Convention.
44
CBC News, “Deported Teen Refugee Back in Toronto” (5 May 2011), online:
<cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/deported-teen-refugee-back-in-toronto-1.1038454> [perma.cc/HYJ7-64UW].
45
CLRA, supra note 5 at s 46.
46
IRPA, supra note 10, s 115; Refugee Convention, supra note 3.
39
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“removal” in section 115 only referred to removal processes under the IRPA, 47 and second,
Articles 13(b) and 20 of the Hague Convention “must be construed in a manner that takes account
of the principle of non-refoulement.”48 Article 20 provides that “[t]he return of the child … may
be refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State
relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”49
The Court further articulated the role of section 7 of the Charter50 in Hague Convention
applications where refugee status is at stake. The Court held that “by virtue of her status as a
Convention refugee, the child’s s. 7 Charter rights to life, liberty and security of the person were
engaged on the Hague application.”51 It held that children with refugee status facing involuntary
removal had rights to a fair process, including meaningful procedural protections (notice,
disclosure, an opportunity to respond and to have “his or her views … considered in accordance
with the child’s age and level of maturity,” and the right to representation), and that “a risk
assessment be performed regarding the existence and extent of any persisting risk of persecution
to be faced by the child on return from Canada to another country.”52
The Court of Appeal held that where a child has refugee status, there is “a rebuttable
presumption of risk of harm within Article 13(b).53 The Court expanded on this to state that a child
does not have the burden of establishing that the conditions of risk continue to exist if they have
refugee status. 54 Where a left-behind parent attempts to rebut this presumption, an application
judge must “assess the existence and extent of any persisting risk of persecution to be faced by the
child.”55
In developing this rebuttable presumption, the Court rejected an argument by the Canadian
Council of Refugees (CCR), as interveners, that the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
should be required to bring an application to vacate or rescind a child’s refugee status, before the
child could be removed to their “habitual residence” by virtue of a Hague Convention
application. 56 The CCR argued that this requirement would ensure that the non-refoulement
concerns were given full consideration before a child was removed. The Court rejected this
argument on two grounds. First, it found that Hague Convention proceedings may meet the
“obligation of non-refoulement by fairly examining the question of whether the risk of persecution
persists,” and second, that resorting to IRPA could interfere with the summary nature of Hague
proceedings, particularly as there is no mechanism for an aggrieved parent to apply for a child’s
refugee status to be vacated. 57 The Court makes clear that the “risk of ‘persecution’ in the
immigration context clearly implicates the type of harm contemplated by art. 13(b) of the Hague
Convention.”58

47

AMRI, supra note 41 at para 63.
Ibid at para 68.
49
Hague Convention, supra note 1, 20.
50
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to
the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
51
AMRI, supra note 41 at para 97.
52
Ibid at paras 99, 120.
53
Ibid at para 78.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid at para 94.
56
Ibid at para 84-5.
57
Ibid at paras 85-86.
58
Ibid at para 74.
48
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However, in so holding, the Court blurred the distinctions between a risk determination in
the context of Hague Convention proceedings and in the refugee context. For instance, refugee
decision-makers must look to the availability of internal flight alternatives and state protection,
whereas a judge presiding over a Hague Convention hearing presumes that a contracting state will
make arrangements for the child’s welfare. 59 Further, a Hague proceeding is an adversarial
process, where the left-behind parent may submit counter-evidence to attempt to establish there is
no risk to the child, as opposed to the typically inquisitorial nature of a refugee hearing where only
the claimant and sometimes the Minister may make submissions.60 Finally, the summary nature of
Hague Convention proceedings may make it difficult for a Court to satisfy the requirement that
“due weight [be given] to the obligation of non-refoulement” by “fairly examining the question of
whether the risk of persecution persists,” within the limited time frame and stricter evidentiary
rules than those which obtain in a refugee hearing.61
Since AMRI, the Court has blocked a Hague Convention application on the basis that this
presumption has not been rebutted on at least one occasion. In Borisovs v Kubiles, the Ontario
Court of Justice found that the child and mother’s successful refugee claim from Latvia created a
rebuttable presumption of grave risk.62 The father’s application for the child’s return was rejected
on the basis that he failed to rebut this presumption. In this case, the Court stated that the father
provided very little evidence of a lack of risk, relying mostly on “his denials, together with positive
reports from his new wife and mother… .” 63 As such, it remains unclear how much evidence will
be sufficient to rebut the presumption. For instance, where both the mother and child’s refugee
claims were based on domestic abuse targeted at the mother, is it possible that a left-behind father
could establish a lack of risk to the child if the child was returned alone, such as the situation in
GB v VM discussed below?

B. ONGOING REFUGEE CLAIMS IN HAGUE APPLICATIONS
Canadian courts are more reluctant to give much weight to ongoing refugee claims in Hague
Convention applications when determining whether the child faces a grave risk upon return. For
instance, in GB v VM, the Ontario Court of Justice narrowly interpreted the grave risk exception
in a situation concerning a mother and child claiming refugee status. 64 In this case, the mother, a
well-known activist and former Hungarian Member of Parliament, had claimed refugee status
along with her child and second husband based on fear of persecution as Roma. The father of her
child brought an application for the return of the child under the Hague Convention. The case did
not involve a claim of domestic violence against the ex-husband, but speaks to the relationship
between ongoing refugee claims and Hague Convention applications.
The mother claimed that the child would face a grave risk if she were returned to Hungary.
The Court noted that since the Mother refused to return with the child (who was fourteen years
old), “[t]he relevant question” was whether she “would be at grave risk of intolerable harm if
59

See Medhurst v Markle, 1995 CanLII 9273 at para 8.
See Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Guidelines issued by the Chairperson pursuant to paragraph
159(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act” (19 January 2016) online: <irbcisr.gc.ca/Eng/BoaCom/references/pol/GuiDir/Pages/GuideDir07.aspx> [perma.cc/W9K2-HMZD].
61
AMRI, supra note 41 at para 85 citing Nmeth at para 52; see also IRPA, supra note 10, s 170.
62
Borisovs v Kubiles, 2013 ONCJ 85.
63
Ibid at para 45.
64
GB v VM, supra note 12.
60
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returned to Hungary, and placed in her father’s care.”65 The Court found that “although there is
some of risk of harm to the child because of her Roma heritage and parentage, [it] is remote and
can be safely managed by the [father].”66 It further emphasized that general country conditions do
not go to grave risk, stating that “[t]he fact that conditions in a country may be more unsettled and
pose a greater risk to its residents than conditions in Canada is not sufficient in itself to establish a
13(b) claim.”67 In this particular case, there was also evidence about the child’s lack of fear of
returning to Hungary, as reported by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.68
The Court considered the significance of the underlying refugee claim in this case. Justice
Murray held that “caselaw has established that a court hearing a Hague application is not required
to and in fact should not delay dealing with the application until determination of a related refugee
claim.”69 In deciding not to delay the Hague Proceedings for the resolution of the refugee claim in
this case, she considered certain features of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB)
process, including that the child’s father would have no standing to present evidence at the IRB
and that an IRB hearing might not involve viva voce argument, examination, or crossexamination.70 Murray J seemed particularly concerned that the mother implied that she had sole
custody of the child in her refugee application documents.71 Echoing other jurisprudence, the court
also expressed concern about the risk of “abuse of the IRB refugee determination process by an
abducting parent to gain a tactical advantage in a looming or pending custody battle.”72
The refusal to delay application hearings for the determination of a refugee claim is in line
with the Convention’s goal of dealing with matters expeditiously, 73 but it also may create
insurmountable evidentiary burdens for victims of domestic violence to establish the grave risk
exception. The refugee determination process, although not without its own procedural challenges,
has more flexible rules of evidence than the judicial system. For instance, it cannot reject evidence
simply because it is hearsay. 74 Further, where the refugee claim between mother and child is
joined, the decision-maker will consider the risk of persecution to both parties, whereas Hague
Convention proceedings must focus solely on whether there is grave risk to the child. Although
our courts recognize that domestic violence may lead to a grave risk to the child, the focus of the
analysis in the context of Hague Convention proceedings must remain solely on the child. A
positive refugee determination may be the most significant way for a mother to establish the risk
of domestic violence to her child in a Hague Convention application dispute. A child returned
under a Hague Convention application before their refugee hearing may never have the opportunity
to establish their claim.

65

Ibid at para 75 [emphasis in original].
Ibid at para 79.
67
GB v VM, supra note 12 at para 72; see also JS v RM, 2012 ABPC 184 (the court rejected an art 13(b) defence for
an application to return a Palestinian child to Israel).
68
Ibid at para 79.
69
Ibid at para 69
70
Ibid at para 71.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid, citing AMRI, supra note 41 at para 73.
73
See Toiber v Toiber, [2006]208 OAC 391 (CA); Solem v Solem, 2013 ONSC 1097; GB v VM, supra note 12 at
para 69.
74
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Further, the Court’s current approach fails to recognize the opposite concern: the potential
for abuse of the Hague Convention process by a parent looking to frustrate the refugee claim of
their fleeing spouse and children. As will be seen below, refugee claimants face significant barriers
when child abduction is alleged.

III. INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION IN REFUGEE
CLAIMS
This section examines the interaction of the Hague Convention with cases of domestic violence in
refugee law. As relatively few refugee determination decisions are published, it is difficult to know
how often the issue of international child abduction arises. However, as will be explored, the
Ministerial Intervention Guidelines (ENF24-Ministerial Interventions) highlight international
child abduction as cause for exclusion. 75 Further, there is a small body of case law from the
Refugee Protection Division (RPD), the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD), and the Federal Court
(FC), which indicates that international child abduction may act as a double-edged sword for
domestic violence claimants.

A. REFUGEE CLAIMS GROUNDED IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Gender is not a recognized ground of persecution in the United Nations’ Refugee Convention’s
definition of a refugee.76 However, the IRB’s guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing
Gender Related-Persecution77 recognize “that domestic violence perpetrated by non-state actors
can amount to persecution and form the basis for a refugee claim.”78 The Supreme Court of Canada
in Ward confirmed that “particular social group” within the definition of a “Convention refugee”
could include gender.79 Domestic violence may therefore be recognized as a ground for a refugee
claim where the state is unable or unwilling to intervene to protect the claimant.
There are, of course, significant challenges for women seeking to establish a successful
refugee claim on the basis of domestic violence. In her review of 645 refugee decisions under the
pre-2012 system, Efrat Arbel found that decision-makers often set a low bar for meaningful state
protection in these cases. As she states, “many adjudicators identified the existence of antidomestic violence legislation, women’s shelters, or other protective services as sufficient to show
the availability of state protection, with few referring to documentary material on the adequacy or
accessibility of these measures.”80 Arbel has further criticized the framework of decision-making
for gender-based claims, which tends to “portray domestic violence as the product of a foreign
culture.”81 Following her arguments, women whose stories do not fit into the tropes of so-called
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“barbaric cultural practices,” 82 such as escaping violence related to polygamy, female genital
mutilation, or oppression under religious law, may face barriers establishing their claims. Women
may also have difficulties documenting patterns of “coercive control” which do not fit into the
model of domestic violence as physical abuse for refugee decision-makers. Further, women who
have experienced domestic violence may struggle to develop a relationship of trust with their
counsel that allows them to discuss the traumatic experiences that ground their claim within the
RPD’s short timelines.83

B. ARTICLE 1F(B) AND INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION
Exclusion based on international child abduction is another significant barrier that women
claiming refugee status based on domestic violence may face. 84 Article 1F(b) of the Refugee
Convention states, “the provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to
whom there are serious reasons for considering that … he has committed a serious non-political
crime outside of the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee.”85 Section
98 of the IRPA states that, “[a] person referred to in section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee
Convention is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection.”86
Therefore, an
individual will be excluded from establishing they are a Convention Refugee or a person in need
of protection if there are serious reasons to believe they have committed “a serious non-political
crime.” Article 1F(b) does not require a conviction or even a charge in order to establish there are
“serious reasons to believe” the claimant has committed a crime.
The Supreme Court of Canada considered the proper interpretation of Article 1F(b) in
Febles v Canada.87 It rejected the argument that the exclusion was only meant to apply to fugitives
from justice and should be narrowly interpreted. Instead, the majority held that,
Article 1F(b) excludes anyone who has ever committed a serious non-political crime
outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee. Its
application is not limited to fugitives, and neither is the seriousness of the crime to be
balanced against factors extraneous to the crime such as present or future danger to the
host society or post-crime rehabilitation or expiation.88
In assessing the seriousness of a crime, the Court stated that, “where a maximum sentence
of ten years or more could have been imposed had the crime been committed in Canada, the crime
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will generally be considered serious.”89 However, the Court was clear that “this generalization
should not be understood as a rigid presumption that is impossible to rebut.”90 As the Court states,
[w]here a provision of the Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, has a large
sentencing range … a claimant whose crime would fall at the less serious end of the
range in Canada should not be presumptively excluded. … While consideration of
whether a maximum sentence of ten years or more could have been imposed had the
crime been committed in Canada is a useful guideline, and crimes attracting a
maximum sentence of ten years or more in Canada will generally be sufficiently
serious to warrant exclusion, the ten-year rule should not be applied in a mechanistic,
decontextualized, or unjust manner.91
Further, following Jayasekara v Canada, when Article 1F(b) is raised as an issue, the Board should
analyze the seriousness of the crime through considering the “elements of the crime, the mode of
prosecution, the penalty prescribed, the facts and the mitigating and aggravating circumstances
underlying the conviction.”92
Whether international parental child abduction constitutes a “serious non-political crime”
remains a contested issue. The IRB takes the position that “[i]nternational kidnapping of a child
constitutes a serious non-political crime”93 and does not differentiate between parental primary
caregiver cases and other abductions. While a Hague Convention application is not necessary to
establish reasonable grounds to believe the taking parent abducted the child, it will be taken as
proof of it.94 The parent does not need to have been charged with child abduction in order to make
this finding. The RAD has held the RPD’s failure to address exclusion once the Minister has raised
it in cases of child abduction is an error of law.95
Indeed, ENF24-Ministerial Interventions highlight “the abduction or removal of a child
from custody in contravention of a custody order” as an issue to which officers should be
particularly alert.96 Sections 280-286 of the Criminal Code govern the abduction of children.97
ENF24-Ministerial Interventions list several factors for officers to consider in determining whether
a taking parent meets this offence under the Code. These include considering “the marital status
of the parents,” “consent by the parent or guardian,” and “a custody order in favour of the parent.”98
However, the Federal Court has recently addressed the classification of parental child
abduction as a serious, non-political crime in AB, CD & EF v Canada.99 In AB, Madam Justice
Strickland considered the RPD’s finding that the applicants were excluded pursuant to Article
1F(b) for the serious non-political crime of child abduction and, alternatively, that the applicants
89
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were not Convention refugees or persons in need of protection, as they had failed to establish
subjective fear or rebut the presumption of state protection.
Although Strickland J ultimately dismissed the application, she found that the Member’s
analysis on exclusion was unreasonable. The maximum penalty for child abduction in Canada is
ten years. However, as discussed by the Court in R v Thrones, “appellate courts, while deploring
crimes involving abduction of children, do not impose anything even close to the maximum
penalties prescribed in the Code. In parental abduction cases, for example, where the maximum
penalty by indictment is ten years, sentence[s] rarely come anywhere close.”100 In light of the
sentencing range in child abduction cases, Strickland J held that the Member erred by failing to
consider whether the ten-year rule from Febles had been rebutted in this case.101
Further, the Court held that the Member erred in failing to apply the Jayasekara factors. It
rejected the Member’s interpretation of Jayasekara and held that “the existence of an international
convention, such as the Hague Convention” is not “the sole factor or ‘standard’ against which
seriousness must be assessed.”102
AB therefore strongly indicates that a member cannot simply assume that child abduction
constitutes a serious non-political crime, but instead must apply Febles and the Jayasekara factors.
This is further strengthened by other recent Federal Court jurisprudence that has held that the
Member “cannot just designate crimes as ‘serious’ under Canadian criminal law on the basis of its
own opinion.” 103 Despite these decisions, however, ENF24-Ministerial Interventions and IRB
policies continue to define child abduction as a “serious crime,” without contextual analysis.104
Of further note, in AB, the Applicants argued that Article 1F(b) was not applicable because
“no crime had been committed outside Canada as the Applicant was permitted, by the custody
order then in place, to remove her daughter from Hungary for two weeks without the prior consent
of her ex-husband. Thus, any crime of abduction occurred only two weeks after the Applicant
arrived in Canada, and not in Hungary.”105 The applicants sought to certify the question, “Does
Article 1F(b) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees apply if the actus reus of
the crime occurs after entry to Canada as a refugee claimant, if the mens rea existed prior to
entry?”106 The Court declined to address this issue or certify the question. The Court in Puerto
Rodriguez v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), discussed further below, also declined to
address this same issue. 107 As a taking custodial parent may only be committing a crime when
they remain in the country of refuge with the child, it seems that applicants facing exclusion on
the basis of child abduction will continue to raise this issue until the Federal Court addresses it.

C. THE SECTION 285 DEFENCE TO CHILD ABDUCTION
ENF24-Ministerial Interventions inform officers to be alert to credible defences under section 285
of the Criminal Code,108 “namely that the acts were necessary to protect the child from imminent
100
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danger or to allow the parent to flee imminent danger.” 109 The Supreme Court has not yet
articulated the precise ambit of this defense, but briefly discussed it in the recent case of MM v
United States.110 The majority in the decision interpreted the defence strictly and held that, “[it] is
available only if the ‘taking, enticing away, concealing, detaining, receiving or harbouring of any
young person’ was necessary either to protect the young person from danger of ‘imminent harm’
or if the person charged was escaping from the danger of ‘imminent harm.’”111
When domestic violence will rise to the point of imminent harm required by the Criminal
Code is unclear. There is no mention in the ENF24-Ministerial Interventions of the potential role
of domestic violence or contextualization of how ongoing spousal or child abuse may constitute
“imminent harm.” Further, the only two cases cited in the ENF24-Ministerial Interventions
involved parents who were excluded from making a refugee claim due to international child
abduction.112 There are no examples of a successful defence for officers. There is no doubt that
international child abduction is a serious crime. However, officers should be more alert to the role
that domestic violence may play in a parent’s decision to take their child to another country,
particularly in the context of refugee law.
One of the cases cited in ENF24-Ministerial Interventions clearly illustrates the Board’s
problematic treatment of international child abduction and the section 285 defence in refugee
cases. Kovacs v Canada concerned a mother and two children who claimed refugee status from
Hungary on the grounds that they faced persecution as Roma and ongoing abuse by her exhusband.113 Prior to the RPD hearing, the father brought a Hague Convention application for the
return of his son. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice denied the father’s application on the grave
risk exception, in large part because the father was a wanted fugitive in Hungary.114 Despite it
being denied, this application alerted the RPD to exclude the mother under Article 1F(b) for child
abduction.
The Federal Court held that the Ontario Superior Court’s decision was not binding on the
Board and upheld the RPD’s decision to find the mother was excluded. It rejected the mother’s
argument that the Board should have considered the Superior Court’s decision that her son would
be at “grave risk” if returned to Hungary in determining whether she met the “imminent harm”
defence under section 285. The Federal Court rejected this argument, stating, “[i]n the Board's
view, the section 285 defence was not applicable because the Board did not believe that the
principal applicant or the children had been the victims of abuse by the husband.”115 The Federal
Court of Appeal took a similar approach in Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v Arias
Garcia, where it found a Quebec judgment refusing the return of a child under the grave risk
exception to the Hague Convention did not have the effect of preventing a removal order under
the IRPA.116
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In December 2015, the Federal Court once again considered the issue of the section 285
defence and domestic violence in a refugee claim in Puerto Rodriguez.117 The case concerned a
mother and minor applicant from Honduras who claimed refugee status on the basis of abuse by
her husband and the risk her son faced from gang violence. The RPD found that the mother was
excluded on the grounds of child abduction. As the Federal Court notes, “while the RPD accepted
that the principal Applicant was a victim of abuse and extortion in the past, it found there was
insufficient persuasive evidence that she was escaping a danger of imminent harm.” 118 This
approach reflects a narrow understanding of domestic abuse and how it presents ongoing danger
to the abused person, even where it may not seem imminent to outsiders.119 It fails to recognize
the role of coercive control in relationships of abuse.120 The Federal Court ultimately overturned
the decision not because of the narrow treatment of domestic violence, but because the RPD failed
to consider the evidence of gang threats against the minor son.121

D. INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION AS A DOUBLE-EDGED
SWORD
As was seen in Kovacs, a Hague Convention application for the return of a child, even where it is
rejected, can lead to an exclusion finding under Article 1F(b). However, in some refugee
determination cases, the Board has found that the absence of a Hague Convention application
indicates a lack of credibility towards establishing domestic violence. For instance, in a RPD
decision from 2012, the Board rejected a mother and daughter who claimed on the grounds of
domestic violence. In dismissing their claim, the member notes that, “Peru is a party to the 1980
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. There was no evidence
to indicate that XXXX, the minor claimant’s father, has been looking for the minor claimant, nor
has there been any application made through the Hague Convention with regards to his
daughter.”122 The RPD made a similar determination in a 2014 case concerning a mother and
daughter claiming refugee status from Namibia.123In a decision at the RAD, the Board determined
that the lack of a Hague Convention application weighed against the claimant’s subjective fear of
continued violence from her spouse if she were to return. 124 In other cases, the Board has
interpreted a woman leaving her children behind with her partner as indicative that she is not
credible in her claim that the partner was abusive. 125 Such decisions fail to consider the risks
created by the Hague Convention and Article 1F(b) for a woman who takes her children with her.
International child abduction laws thus cut against women fleeing domestic violence in two
ways. Where the left-behind spouse does not legally pursue the taken child, the RPD may find this
weighs against the credibility of the woman’s claim that she faces an ongoing risk of persecution
if she returns to her home country. At the same time, the lack of contextualized analysis for serious
117
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non-political crimes and narrow defence for child abduction in Canadian law may exclude a mother
from claiming refugee status based on the domestic violence of her left-behind partner. Examining
international child abduction laws from an immigration lens thus reveals a myriad of other ways
that the Hague Convention may exacerbate the vulnerability of women fleeing domestic violence
across national boundaries with their children.

IV. CONCLUSION: SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR LEGAL
INTERVENTION
Most critiques of the Hague Convention in the context of domestic violence have focused on how
the regime itself should be rewritten or re-interpreted to recognize the devastating effects of
domestic violence on children.126 Through centering the interaction of family law and refugee law
in this regime, this paper concludes by offering a few other suggestions about how we might
maintain the laudable goal of protecting children from the harmful effects of abduction while
protecting the principle of non-refoulement for women and children fleeing domestic violence.

A. CHANGES TO HAGUE CONVENTION APPLICATIONS IN CANADA
In the family law context, the AMRI decision provides strong guidelines to judges about safeguards
that should be in place where a child has been granted refugee status. However, as was discussed
above, there is no obligation on family law courts to wait until the resolution of the refugee claim.
It is suggested that where the application is based on domestic violence, there should be a
presumption to wait to address the Hague application until the resolution of the corresponding
refugee claim.
According to the 2008 statistical survey on the Hague Convention, in Canada the mean
duration of proceedings was 137 days for a return and 121 days for a refusal.127 The IRPA requires
refugee hearings to be scheduled within sixty days of the filing of the asylum claim.128However,
the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rarely meets these timelines. In January 2018, the
Immigration Refugee Board informed new refugee claimants that they should expect their claims
to be heard within twelve to twenty four months, despite the regulations.129 Although the Ontario
Court of Appeal has stated in AMRI, “[e]xpediency will never trump fundamental human rights,”
it is unlikely that Ontario family law judges will allow for such a significant additional delay to
interfere with the Hague Convention’s objective to deal with matters expeditiously.130 Therefore,
I would suggest that while these RPD delays exist, it may be necessary to create a mechanism to
“fast-track” refugee claims, where a left-behind parent has begun Hague Convention proceedings,
in order to ensure these claims are heard within the sixty day timeline. Doing so would prevent the
126
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undue delay of a Hague application, while also ensuring that children who meet the definition of
refugee can access the procedural safeguards established by the Court of Appeal in AMRI. That
stated, taking parents could face significant barriers in establishing the grave risk exception should
their refugee claim fail before their Hague Convention hearing.
Another potential area for change that would assist custodial parents and their children
fleeing domestic violence is in the interpretation of the meaning of “habitual residence.” The
interpretation of the child’s habitual residence will determine whether or not the mechanism for
return under the Hague Convention is available. The jurisprudence in Canada is currently mixed
on whether a court should take into account only joint parental intention when interpreting the
meaning of habitual residence or instead focus on the reality of the child.131
Requiring joint parental intention to change a child’s habitual residence eliminates the
opportunity for the habitual residence to shift where a parent is fleeing domestic violence with
their child. The Ontario Court of Appeal ruled recently in Balev v Baggot that a shared parental
intention was required to change a child’s habitual residence. 132 However, at the time of
publication of this article, the Supreme Court of Canada has heard the appeal in Office of the
Children’s Lawyer v John Paul Balev, et al., where the main issue is the interpretation of “habitual
residence” in the context of the Hague Convention.133
A child-centred approach to the determination of habitual residence would allow the court
to find that a child’s habitual residence is Canada where the child’s intention, whether or not that
intention is aligned with one of the parents, was to claim refugee status and, therefore, remain in
Canada. A child-centred approach would be particularly helpful, therefore, for cases where an
older child has left the country on their own or with a parent fleeing domestic violence. Rather
than require both parents to intend that the child relocate in order to establish that the habitual
residence had shifted to Canada, the court should consider whether the child understood the move
and their integration into their new community to be permanent, giving their views due weight in
accordance with their age and abilities. Such an approach would require giving more weight to the
voice of the child, in line with children’s section 7 rights as articulated in AMRI and Canada’s
international legal obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.134 If the child’s
habitual residence has shifted to Canada as a result of the making of a refugee claim, the Hague
Convention will no longer provide a mechanism for return.
Therefore, a more child-centric approach to the interpretation of “habitual residence” in the
adjudication of these cases may help to ensure that Hague Convention applications are not used to
force the return of children seeking refugee status, either alone or with a parent fleeing domestic
violence. Even where a refugee claim is unsuccessful, the very act of making the claim could weigh
towards a finding that the habitual residence had shifted to Canada. Unfortunately, this potential
shift in the law may not be able to assist parents fleeing with younger children, as the weight given
to a child’s views is dependent on their age and abilities. However, it should play an important
role for older children, and their parent, who view their move to Canada as a permanent one.
Hopefully, the Supreme Court will consider the negative effects of an interpretation of
habitual residence requiring shared parental intention on mothers and children who are fleeing
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domestic violence and the importance of a child centred approach in its upcoming decision in
Office of the Children’s Lawyer v John Paul Balev, et al.

B. REFUGEE LAW SOLUTIONS
From a refugee law perspective, there may be hard and soft law solutions to the issue of the
interpretation of international child abduction in the operation of Article 1F(b). As a preliminary
step, the IRB and Citizenship and Immigration Canada could amend the Gender Guidelines and
ENF24-Ministerial Interventions to address this issue. ENF24-Ministerial Interventions should
have considerably more information on the role that domestic violence may play in a decision to
flee with a child and how “imminent harm” should be read broadly to incorporate ongoing
domestic abuse and forms of coercive control. Further, the Gender Guidelines could include a
section on how Members should be careful about the exclusion of a woman for child abduction
where their claim is based on domestic abuse.
While the Gender Guidelines are not legislation, “failure to apply them in appropriate cases
may constitute a reviewable error.”135 However, as Dauvergne and Labman have stated, “[h]aving
guidelines can only take the decision-maker so far.”136 There is a large body of Federal Court
decisions that address IRB members’ “basic lack of sensitivity” in regard to domestic violence and
gender-based persecution claims. 137 Although changing the Gender Guidelines may be an
important step, it is unlikely to go far enough to ensure IRB members approach parental child
abduction cases, where there has been domestic violence, with sufficient insight or sensitivity.
A more effective solution may be to advance the argument put forth in Puerto Rodriguez
and AB that in many cases parental child abduction does not actually meet the definition in Article
1F(b). Where a parent has custody, their act of leaving the country with their child without the
other parent’s consent only becomes criminal upon remaining in Canada past a certain time.
Therefore, it does not meet the meaning within Article 1F(b) of having “committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the country of refuge.”138 If the crime takes place within Canada, it should
fall under the analysis for inadmissibility for serious criminality on the basis of child abduction,
which would require an actual conviction.139 Thus far, as described above, the Federal Court has
not addressed or certified a question on this issue.
Requiring an analysis of where the alleged criminal act actually took place would allow for
a differentiation between a custodial parent leaving with their child and a non-custodial parent or
non-parent abducting a child across state lines. In addition to being a more accurate application of
Article 1F(b), such an approach would ensure that a victim of domestic violence who flees with
her children would not be unfairly excluded from establishing a refugee claim. Custodial parents
135
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would still be subject to returning the child based on a successful Hague Convention application
and would still be required to establish the actual merits of their claim.
These interventions could go a long way towards addressing the challenge of protecting
children against international child abduction while allowing women and children to seek refuge
in cases of domestic violence. More broadly, this article has demonstrated how the interaction of
family, immigration, and at times criminal law, operate to regulate the mobility of mothers and
children fleeing domestic violence. While the number of cases where Hague Convention
applications and refugee claims directly overlap is small, they illuminate the broader operation of
family and immigration regimes to regulate intimate relationships. This paper reveals how these
regimes may operate to exacerbate vulnerabilities when children are returned to abusive parents
or mothers are excluded from making refugee claims. Without concrete solutions such as those
offered above, these problems will continue to arise as families form and fracture across national
borders.
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